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Abstract
In this paper we report on the use of the Larch Prover to mechanize the correctness proof of the audio control
protocol as presented in BPV
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  Introduction
The systems that are analysed using formal methods increase in size and complexity and so
do the proofs Because it is not realistic to assume that a proof of  pages is awless the
computer is asked for help to check those proofs The protocol that is subject of investigation
here is a fragment of the Enhanced Easy Link EEL protocol This protocol is used by
Philips to communicate control information between the components of an audio set CD
DCC ampli	er tuner etc Though a simpli	ed version of the protocol is veri	ed the same
as in 
BPV it is still fairly complicated
As a vehicle to mechanize the proof we used the Larch Prover LP LP is a proofchecker
for 	rstorder predicate logic and it is based on rewriting It has been used for protocol
veri	cation in a comparable model MMT 
LSGL Here we use the Linear Hybrid Systems
LHS model of 
BPV the semantics of systems in this model is de	ned in terms of timed
IOautomata 
LV LV GSSL
We think that both general proof checkers and model checkers are useful for protocol
veri	cation Model checkers require the description to be 	nite in some sense and sometimes
the type of questions the system can answer is restricted On the other hand the advantage
of model checking is of course that the questions are answered without any user interaction
When using general mathematical proof checkers almost no restrictions on the description
of the system andor the type of questions exist But here much more user interaction is
required to 	nish the proof
As a correctness criterion we use traceinclusion between the EEL protocol and a speci	
cation This tells us that the EEL protocol behaves like a message buer with capacity one
  


 

 
 


 

 
 


Figure  Manchester encoding of 
and that each message is delivered before a speci	ed moment To prove this we use invariants
and a simulation relation
We formalized the whole proof including proofs of simple identities like x      Other
users of LP 
CL chose to concentrate on the crucial parts and assume simple properties
like
  X  jY j   
i
Y   jY j   
i
 X  Y   
i
  
We proved facts like these because if they are really simple it should be easy to prove them
and when they are not simple it is possible that one makes a mistake Also we think it
interesting to see what happens if one tries to prove everything from the basic axioms
This paper is organized as follows In the next section the EEL protocol is introduced In
Section  the LHS model is informally introduced In Section  the model and the protocol
are formalized In Section  the Larch Prover is introduced In Section  the correctness
proof is formalized In the last section we discuss the results of our work In two appendices
an example proof is presented and the formal speci	cations are listed
 The EELprotocol
The EEL protocol is used by Philips for communication of control information between the
components of an audio set When for instance only the ampli	er has a redeye to receive
the commands of the remote control the other components receive these commands via the
EELprotocol It is also used to implement added intelligence one can copy a CD to a
cassette by pressing a single key the CD and the cassetedeck are started and when the CD
has 	nished playing the deck stops recording In fact the components are connected by a
small local area network LAN This network has one special quality it is cheap It uses
only one wire no extra clock wire is needed Furthermore high tolerances on the timing are
allowed this makes it possible to implement the network via processors that are also used
for other tasks
To transmit messages from one component to the other Manchester encoding is used The
components are connected by a single wire the bus On this wire the voltage can be either
high or low Time is divided in bitslots of equal length Bits are transmitted halfway the
bitslots a bit  is transmitted by changing the voltage from low to high a bit  is transmitted
by changing the voltage in the other direction If the same bit is transmitted twice in a row
the voltage changes exactly in between See Figure  for an example
This is the basic idea but some problems must be solved
 The downgoing edges are not sharp enough to be accurately detected so the receiver
 Linear Hybrid Systems 
only detects the upgoing edges To make correct reception of messages still possible a
restriction is needed only messages of odd length or ending in  are valid
 The receiver does not know when the 	rst bitslot of a message starts Therefore each
message starts with a bit and between messages the voltage on the wire is low
 The receiver does not know the length of the message it is receiving
 All timing is inexact because the protocol has to share one micro processor with several
other processes The Philips documentation of the protocol allows a tolerance of 
on all timings
 Arbitration is needed when two senders start transmitting at the same time
 The delay on the bus can be signi	cant
Problems  and  are not addressed in this paper problem  is analysed in 
Gri
 Linear Hybrid Systems
In this section we give an informal introduction into the LHS model of 
BPV The seman
tics is de	ned using oldfashioned recipes 
AL in a layered fashion The IO automata
model is based on labeled transition systems In the untimed case the transition labels can be
input and output actions which model the interactions of a system with its environment and
internal actions which model internal computation steps In 
LV LV it is shown how
realtime systems can be represented as labeled transition systems by adding as additional
labels timepassage actions In the resulting model of timed IO automata the continuous
progress of realtime is represented by a continuum of discrete timepassage transitions The
LHS model can be viewed as a subclass of timed IO automata 
BPV
The preconditioneectstyle is used to de	ne the LHSsystems Each state of the labeled
transition system is described by a valuation of the state variables When the init predicate
holds for a state it is a start state For every state variable v we have a primed variable v
 
to denote the new value of v after a transition The labeled transitions are described by the
precondition and eect functions When the precondition holds in a state s and the eect on
s is s
 
then a transition from s to s
 
exists
In Figure  an example of a LHS in the style of 
BPV is given The system receives
a message by a IN action and after lengthmessage time units the message is transmitted
by an OUT action The clock x is not very accurate when time elapses by d the clock is
advanced by an amount between d and d The discrete variables list in the example
are not allowed to change during a time step this is expressed by Unchanged list in the
TIMEd action predicate Now we come to a somewhat subtle point Suppose the length
of the message is  then the OUT action must occur when x equals  What happens if x
equals  the time action takes a giant leap to a new state where x equals  That is the
TIMEd action didnt allow the OUT action to occur This scenario is not possible because
StableBelow x precEOUT list states that if the OUT list action is possible now or in
the future this should still hold after the time step The function precEOUT list returns
Discrete list  List
Continuous x  Time
init list    x  
INm
Eect
list  m	 x  

OUT list
Precondition
x  lengthlist   list  
Eect
list  
T IMEd
Action formula
  d  

  Unchangedlist
  
  d  x
 
 x    d
  StableBelow x precEOUT list
Figure  Example of LHSsystem
 Formal speci	cation 
the precondition of the action OUT list of the system E The other functions used in the
action formula of the TIMEd action are de	ned as follows
For W a 	nite set of unprimed variables  an unprimed formula and x an unprimed
variable
UnchangedW 
 

V
wW
w
 
w
Stable
 
  
 
Belowx 
 
 x
 
 x  x
 
 
x
 
x
Note that system E forgets the former message when a new message is received before the
current message is transmitted
In LHSsystems a clock is just a continuous variable updated by the time action A
clock can be inspected and reset by all actions compared to other values or other clocks
Furthermore a clock can dier from the ideal clock see example so a lot of other things can
be described using continuous variables waterlevels leaked gas Of course the behaviour
of the time action is restricted for instance two steps of one timeunit should result in the
same state as one step of two timeunits For a formal de	nition of the restriction on the
time action we refer to 
BPV
 Formal specification
To formalize part of the LHSmodel and the protocol the Larch Shared Language LSL
is used LSL is a 	rstorder algebraic speci	cation language also used to specify software
Besides LSL the Larch family consists of several other languages the Larch interface lan
guages These make it for instance possible to specify a program partly in LSL and partly in
programming language such as C and still do type checking
In this paper LSL is used as a frontend for the Larch Prover LP The LP input corre
sponding to a speci	cation in lename can be generated automatically by lsl lp lename
We will start with the LSL speci	cation of the List and Time datatypes Then we will
formalize part of the LHS model followed by a formalization of the EEL protocol Finally
the correctness criterion will be given
 Lists and Time in LSL
In this section we will give the List and Time traits that we will use in the speci	cation of
the EEL protocol The List data type will be used in the protocol to store the messages
Here we will use the speci	cation as a LSL example We will present the LSL speci	cation
piece by piece

List  trait
includes Bit Nat
In the 	rst line the name of the trait module is given In the second line the traits Bit
and Nat are included Including a trait is taking the union of the introduces and asserts
clauses of the current trait and the included traits

introduces
head  List  Bit
tail  List  List
last  List  Bit
lasttwo  List  List
length  List  Nat
empty   List
    List  List  List
	  Bit  List
finalize  List  List
The introduces clause introduces new function symbols and their types

asserts
List generated by empty	BitList

forall de  Bit mll  List
headempty  
headd	m  d
tailempty  empty
taild	m  m
lastempty  
lastm  d	  d
lasttwoempty  empty
lasttwod	  d	
lasttwom  d	  e	  d	  e	
lengthempty  
lengthd	  m  slengthm
finalizem  if lastm   
 oddlengthm
then m
else m  	
A generated by clause asserts that a list of operators is a complete set of generators for
a sort That is each value of the sort is equal to one that can be written as a 	nite number
of applications of just those operators and variables of other sorts 
GH
Lists are generated by the empty list empty lists with one element  Bit  List
and the concatenation operator  The axioms for the functions head tail last last two
length and nalize are taken from 
BPV The nalize function is speci	c for the speci	cation
of the EEL protocol It is used in the speci	cation of the receiver When necessary it adds a
bit to a message

l  l  m  l  l  m
 Formal speci	cation 
m  empty  m 
empty  m  m 
d	  l  empty 
d  e 
 l  l  d	  l  e	  l
These axioms complete the speci	cation of our List datatype These were implicitly
assumed in the handwritten proof but we had to make them explicit in the formalization
Note that the booleans and the conjunction 	
 are part of the LSL language Also the
if then else construct is part of LSL
Each wellformed trait de	nes a theory in a multisorted 	rstorder logic with equality Each
theory contains the traits assertions the conventional axioms of 	rstorder logic everything
that follows from them and nothing else This loose semantic interpretation guarantees that
formulas in the theory follow only from the presence of assertions in the trait  never from
their absence Using the loose interpretation ensures that all theorems proved about an
incomplete speci	cation remain valid when it is extended page  
GH
In Appendix B the Time trait is given The continuous variables of LHS are of type Real
As mentioned in 
BPV for the purpose of this veri	cation any interpretation of Real as
an ordered 	eld will do the only properties of reals that we use are the axioms for ordered
	elds So the Time trait contains essentially the properties of an ordered 	eld For notational
convenience some functions and constants are added like the integer numbers    the
other inequalities 	  and the min function Speci	c for this veri	cation a constant T
which denotes the drifting of the clocks is added Furthermore an almost equal operator 

is de	ned that will be used in the proof In LSL and LP there is no need for functions to be
total so we did not add 
 
  as in 
BPV
 The LHS model
In this section the LSLspeci	cation of the LHSmodel is given That is a part of the model
traces executions and simulations Not de	ned in this paper are composition of systems
hiding and liveness As starting point we used traits for MMTautomata that are presented
in 
LSGL The main dierence is the way time is handled the adaption comes down to
deleting some traits the ones that handle time intervals and slightly adapting the others
In Figure  the trait System is depicted This trait contains the basics for all systems every
trait that de	nes a LHSsystem will include this one In this trait are the declarations for
the underlying labeled transition system the sort StatesA corresponding to the states of
the system the function start denoting the set of start states the function isStep denoting
the transitionrelation Using the brackets 
 	nite sequences are constructed s
 
a
 
s

a

s

is written as 
s
 

a
 
 s


a

 s

 The function execFrag tests if a sequence is an execution
fragment and the function trace returns the list of visible actions from a sequence The
common function is needed because in the formalization every system has its own sort for
actions and sorts are disjunct in LSL The common function maps the actions that systems
have in common to a new sort CommonActions see appendix B This makes it possible to
compare the actions and traces of dierent systems
SystemAtrait
introduces
start  StatesA	  Bool
pre  StatesA	 ActionsA	  Bool
eff  StatesA	 ActionsA	 StatesA	  Bool
isStep  StatesA	 ActionsA	 StatesA	  Bool
	  StatesA	  StepSeqA	
	  StepSeqA	 ActionsA	 StatesA	  StepSeqA	
execFrag  StepSeqA	  Bool
first last  StepSeqA	  StatesA	
isVisible  ActionsA	  Bool
common  ActionsA	  CommonActions
empty   Traces
    Traces CommonActions  Traces
trace  ActionsA	  Traces
trace  StepSeqA	  Traces
reachable  StatesA	  Bool
asserts
StepSeqA	 generated by 	 	
Traces generated by empty 

forall aa  ActionsA	 ss  StatesA	 ss StepSeqA	
isSteps a s  presa 
 effs a s
execFrags	
execFragssas	  execFragss 
 isSteplastssas
firsts	  s firstssas	  firstss
lasts	  s lastssas	  s
tracea  if isVisiblea then empty  commona else empty
traces	  empty
tracessas	  if isVisiblea then tracess  commona else tracess
reachables  
E ss execFragss 
 startfirstss 
 lastss  s
Figure  LSL trait System
ForwardABf  trait
assumes SystemA SystemB
introduces f  StatesA	 StatesB	  Bool
asserts 
forall s s  StatesA	 u  StatesB	 a  ActionsA	
alpha  StepSeqB	
starts  
E u startu 
 fsu
fsu 
 isStepsas 
 reachables 
 reachableu 

E alpha execFragalpha 
 firstalpha  u 

fs lastalpha 
 tracealpha  tracea
Figure  LSL trait Forwardlsl
 Formal speci	cation 	
We say that a system implements another system when the set of traces of A is a subset
of the set of traces of B To prove this we use a forward simulation relation between the
implementation and the speci	cation In a forward simulation each start state of the im
plementation is related to at least one start state of the speci	cation When two states are
related and the implementation can do an action a the speci	cation can also do an action
a and the new states are also related When it has been proved that a forward simulation
exists a metatheorem see for instance 
LV gives us the trace inclusion In Figure  the
notion of a forward simulation is de	ned Because it is restricted to the reachable states this
is essentially the weak forward simulation of 
LV
In this paper we use the untimed interpretation of timed systems In 
BPV there
are input output and internal actions and a special time action Here we have visible and
invisible actions where the input output and time actions are visible and the internal actions
are invisible In timed traces each action has a time stamp and the time action itself does not
occur as an action in the traces An untimed trace of timed system is just a sequence of actions
and the time action occurs in it like the other visible actions The untimed interpretation
is sound in the sense that trace inclusion in the untimed interpretation implies timed trace
inclusion in the timed interpretation We chose to work with this untimed interpretation
because it is slightly easier to work with We refer to 
LV for a formal description of the
relation between the timed and the untimed interpretation
	 The EEL protocol
In appendix B the machine readable de	nition of the protocol is presented In this section
we will point out the dierences between the original speci	cation of 
BPV and the Larch
trait S in the appendix
The system de	ned in trait S corresponds to the composition of the sender S and the
receiver R with the UP action hidden as internal action HIDE UP IN S k R of 
BPV
In this paper the whole system is presented directly instead of presenting the subsystems S
and R and the whole system as a composition of these because the composition operator k
is not de	ned in LP
Some dierences between the originalspeci	cation 
BPV and the one given in this paper
are caused by abbreviations in the original speci	cation For assignments the x  c notation
is used instead of x  c The phrase if b then x  c else x  x is abbreviated to if b then
x  c When a variable is not assigned a new value it is assumed to have the same value in
the new state so x  x is added implicitly These notations are not formalized in LP
A more substantial dierence between the original and the LSL version of the speci	cation
is caused by the fact that LP does not support higherorder logic In the original speci	cation
the phrase StableBelow x precSUP  expresses that When the precondition of UP holds
or can hold in the future the TIMEd action is not allowed to bring the system in a state
where this does not hold The higherorder functions are replaced by 	rstorder functions
that exhibit exactly the same behaviour For this purpose the function aux is introduced it
is essentially the same as the precondition The only dierence is that the clock variable x is
added as a parameter Using this helpfunction the phrase can be translated to

E y y  sSx 
 auxsyUP  
E z z  sSx 
 auxszUP


This section is 	nished by a small piece of a speci	cation in both styles to give an idea of
the distance between the two First the normal notation is given followed by the Larch
Shared Language version Note that this is not part of the EEL speci	cation as used in the
veri	cation because the error variable is not taken into account
IN m
Precondition
  headm
  oddlengthm  last twomh

i
Eect
if transmitting   wire high   list then list  m
x  


  INm 
pres INm 
headm   
 oddlengthm 
 lasttwom  	  	
effs INm s  
if sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty
then sSlist  m 
 sSx  
else sSlist  sSlist 
 sSx  sSx

 sStransmitting  sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh  sSwirehigh

 sR  sR 
 Correctness criterion
Beside a speci	cation of the protocol a speci	cation of the desired behaviour is needed the
LSLde	nition of this system is presented in appendix B
The speci	cation of system P is slightly dierent from the original speci	cation 
BPV
which contained a small mistake The precondition of the OUT action was
OUT list
Precondition
list      T x  lengthlist  Q
chaos
but it should have been
OUT m
Precondition
list  m   list      T x  lengthlist  Q
chaos
This makes a dierence when chaos is true in the former case only OUT list actions
are allowed while in the new case OUT m actions for arbitrary messages m are allowed
Although the 	rst version was on paper the handwritten proof assumed the second speci	
cation
 Introduction to LP 


 Introduction to LP
The Larch Prover LP 
GG GH is an interactive proof support system It does not use
complicated heuristics to search for a proof It supports 	rstorder logic and is based on
rewriting When LP is asked to prove a conjecture it typically normalizes the conjecture
using the rewriterule versions of the axioms and the lemmas that have already been proved
When a normalform is reached the proof is suspended and the user can invoke a command
We will mention a few typical options The user can start a proof by cases making LP to
generate a subgoal for each case A proof by induction is possible when a sort has a set of
generators This set of generators must be given by the user LP will then generate a subgoal
for each generator An other possibility is to apply a rewrite rule in the reversed direction this
is allowed because the rewriterules are oriented axioms not implications When quanti	ers
are involved variables or constants can be 	xed specialized or generalized Furthermore LP
can compute criticalpairs and complete a set of rewriterules Besides these proofcommands
LP has commands to direct the orientation of axioms into rewriterules to make rewriterules
inactive to make proof scripts etc Because a proof in LP is based on rewriting the tool is
good at it it is fast and rewriting modulo associativity and commutativity is supported
As mentioned before the lsl tool compiles the LSLtraits into LP scripts These scripts
can be executed from LP to add the axioms of the traits to the current set of facts The
	rst step of constructing a proof in LP is to orient the axioms into rewrite rules Several
methods are provided to do this The standard method is a registered ordering based on a
LPsuggested partial ordering of operators This usually works very well without any user
interaction This method is also used to orient the new facts like assumptions and proved
conjectures that are generated during the proof We sometimes guided it toward the intended
result by providing a small part of the ordering on the function symbols Another method is
polynomial ordering we did not use this for the proof of this paper The least elegant are the
bruteforce ordering procedures which give users complete control over whether equations
are oriented from left to right or in the other direction This method is used sometimes in
a proof when we want to use a rewrite rule in the other direction typically to expand a
de	nition     
If a set of rules is nonterminating and LP is apparently in a rewriteloop LP will stop
the normalization after a number of rewrite steps This number can be chosen by the user
A reasonable number is one thousand which is the default value In our experience this
happens hardly ever If it happens the user can do several things One can increase the
maximum number of rewrite steps and resume the normalization An oending rule can be
made inactive thereafter LP will not use it in rewriting Another option is to orient a rule
in the other direction A more elegant solution is to use polynomial ordering or a registered
ordering to guarantee that the rewrite system is terminating
Note that LP does not require the user to prove that the set of rules is consistent or
terminating The authors expect that an inconsistency will reveal itself when one starts
using the rules in a proof
When the user is satis	ed with the set of rewrite rules the proving can really start When
a proof is nontrivial and sometimes even when it is trivial it is necessary to have a fairly
detailed handwritten proof before LP is started It is possible to play around in LP and

 
just try a proof by induction and see what happens And when it does not work use the
cancel command to backtrack to the point just before the induction proof was started In
our experience this only worked in very rare cases
We constructed most of our proofs in LP in several rounds In the 	rst round we constructed
a rough proof When a subgoal was not interesting but still complicated to prove we just
added the goal as an axiom to the system thereby skipping that part of the proof Although
a proof with holes is not a proof at all it still provides useful information The user can go
to the problematic parts of the proof very fast and begin proving those parts Hereby he
gets a higher con	dence in the correctness of the conjecture before starting with the time
consuming and boring parts of the proof Furthermore it sometimes turned out that several
adhoc axioms were almost the same so it was useful to construct a lemma and use it to
prove these subgoals instead of proving the same thing several times In the next rounds we
proved some skipped subgoals sometimes these proofs also contained some skipped subgoals
We continued in this way till the proof was complete
This method is possible and reasonable because LP can generate script	les of the com
mands the user types The script 	les are plain ASCII 	les with neatly indented commands
with some extra annotation When a subgoal is generated LP adds a diamond  and when
a subgoal is proved a box  is added This annotation is useful when the conjecture
or the set of axioms is slightly changed and a proof is rerun When LP runs a script and
encounters a box but has not proved a subgoal it stops and noti	es the user about the
problem Without this annotation LP would execute all following commands to that subgoal
and it would be very hard to 	nd the place were the problems started
To 	nish the introduction in LP in the diagrams below two very simple LP proofs are
presented The 	rst lemma states that lengthm  d  slengthm while the cor
responding axiom is lengthd  m  slengthm For this purpose a more general
theorem is proved lengthl  l  lengthl  lengthl by induction on l For
the l  empty case LP proves it without user interaction Note that x    x  is com
mutative and empty  m  m For the case l  b where b is fresh variable of type
Bit some user interaction is necessary
The subgoal now reads slengthl  lengthb  lengthl So we have to
convince LP that lengthb  s We use the mempty fact m  empty  m and of
the List trait lengthd  m  slengthm A critical pair of these is
lengthd  slengthempty After this fact has been added the proof is completed
by normalization

set name p
prove list lengthm  d	  slengthm
prove lengthl  l  lengthl  lengthl
res by ind on l
 basis subgoal
	 basis subgoal
 basis subgoal
cripair List with mempty
	 basis subgoal
 Formalization of the proof 

 induction subgoal
	 induction subgoal
	 conjecture
	 conjecture
For the second example we do not give any intuition but only the facts mentioned in the
proof
x  y  x  z  y  z  TimeF
x  y 	
   z  x  z  y  z  TimeF
x  y 
	 y  x  TimeL

set name p
prove time x  x  
prove x    mx  
ins y by  z by mx in TimeF
	 conjecture
res by case x   mx  
 case justification
res by case   x
 case   xc
	 case   xc
 case   xc
ins x by  y by xc in TimeL
ins x by xc in p
	 case   xc
	 case justification
 case xc  
ins x by  y by xc z by xc in TimeF
	 case xc  
 case mxc  
ins x by  y by mxc z by mxc in TimeF
	 case mxc  
	 conjecture
qed
 Formalization of the proof
In this section we will report on the proof that there exists a weak forward simulation from
the implementation S to the speci	cation P
Unlike the handwritten proof the formal proof starts with proving dataidentities Apart
from three trivial lemmas over the Bit and Nat sorts we have a dozen identities over the
sort List For instance lastl    lasttwol       and
lengthm  d  slengthm These are fairly easy to prove with LP The twelve also
include some trivial ones like lastd  d and taild  empty These hardly deserve
it to be a lemma the proof consists of applying one rewrite rule in the reversed direction


d  empty  d  d  empty But once these identities have been proven last
will be rewritten to  without further user interaction This seemed very useful because
sometimes a conjecture did not normalize as expected because we assumed last  
while LP did not know this And when the logical system contains about four hundred
facts some of them one screen full it can be hard to 	nd that the reasoning is stuck at
last  
We have about thirty lemmas concerning the data type Time Again we have some trivial
ones like m   where mx is the negation of x
 
 But we also have some lemmas that
needed some thought how to prove them in LP We started with some basic properties like
   For this one we needed about twenty proof commands we think that this is not
an optimal proof probably both at the abstract mathematical level and at the level of LP
commands it is possible to optimize it
In the proof the relation between the clock of the sender and the receiver is very important
In 
BPV an operator 
 is used to express that two clocks are approximately the same
that is equal modulo drifting It is de	ned as follows our ASCII notation for 
 is 
x 
 y
 

 T
  T
x  y 
  T
 T
x
About ten of the lemmas contain the 
 operator these are relatively intricate to prove
in LP An example is y   	
 x  y  x  y   For this one we used about
forty proof commands in LP It is listed in Appendix A First we constructed a very detailed
handwritten proof of ten steps The LP proof comes down to instantiating facts and explicitly
applying rewrite rules in the reversed direction To prevent that we lose track we constructed
a sub proof for every step of the handwritten proof Of course it is possible to do it without
a division in sub proofs but then the proof would consist of a long list of instantiate and
rewrite commands and it would not be clear how it corresponds to the handwritten proof
Furthermore the logical system the set of facts would get messy It would contain a lot of
instantiated rules and some other rules are made inactive to use them for reversed rewriting
Sometimes such a messy system has unexpected rewrite properties By using a proof for each
step a proof context is created for each step These are deleted when the step is proved and
only the subconjecture is added to the top context
After the data lemmas the real proof starts The rest of the proof presented here is the
Larch formalization of the proof presented in 
BPV so all de	nitions are taken from that
paper When there is a dierence we will say so
First we prove some invariants about the state space of the sender We start with an easy
one it reects the observation that the sender is always transmitting if the voltage on the
bus is high In LSL invariants are functions with this signature inv StatesA  Bool
invs  sSwirehigh  sStransmitting

We do not use the more natural notation  x because in an old release LP could not parse its own output
when the unary  was involved
 Formalization of the proof 

For every invariant we prove a that it holds in the start states and b that if a state
is reachable and the invariant holds and the system can do an action to a new state the
invariant holds also in this new state In LP this is expressed as follows
prove
a startsStatesS	  invs 

b reachablesStatesS	 
 invs 
 isStepsStatesS	as  invs

Given a and b it follows that c holds
c reachables  invs
In higher order logic we can prove that the implication ab c holds where inv is a variable
of type StatesS  Bool In LP we have a proof that is replicated for each invariant were
inv is substituted by the current concrete invariant This is one of the few cases were the fact
that LP is a 	rst order tool is really a disadvantage
The next invariant gives an upper bound of the clock in the various stages of progress of
the sender
invSs  
sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty

 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 sStransmitting 
 sSx  

 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 sStransmitting

 headsSlist   
 sSx  

 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 sStransmitting

 headsSlist   
 sSx  

 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 headsSlist 
 sSx  

 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 headsSlist   
 sSx  
Now we give invariants for relations between the states of the sender and the receiver The
next invariant tells us that during normal operation serror is false an input of a new
message can only happen when the receiver is at rest This invariant is slightly dierent from
the one given in 
BPV where the serror disjunct has been omitted in the conclusion of
the implication In Section  we discuss this mistake
invFirstBits  sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty 
 sStransmitting
 sRlist  empty 
 serror
For the correctness of the implementation it is very important how the clocks of the sender
and the receiver are related The 	rst invariant gives the possible distances and the second
gives a more detailed description The second diers from the one presented in 
BPV in
the same way as invFirstBit diers from the original
invWs  
sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh 
sRx  sSx  

 sRx  sSx  

 sRx  sSx 
 headsSlist   

 sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh 


sRx  sSx

 sRx  sSx   
 sSlist  empty 
 headsSlist  
invXs  
serror 
 sStransmitting 
 sRlist  empty  
 lastsRlist   
 sRx  pTmT  

 sRx  sSx

 lastsRlist   
 mTpT    sRx 
 sRx  pTmT  

 sRx  sSx  

 lastsRlist   
 sRx  pTmT  

 sRx  sSx  

 lastsRlist   
 mTpT    sRx 
 sRx  pTmT  

 sRx  sSx  

  serror 
 sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh

 sSlist  empty 
 sRlist  empty  
 lastsRlist   
 sRx   
 sRx  sSx

 lastsRlist   
 mTpT    sRx 
 sRx  

 sRx  sSx  

 lastsRlist   
 mTpT    sRx 
 sRx  

 sRx  sSx  

 serror 
 sRlist  empty  
sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh
The next invariant implies that during normal operation output of a message by the receiver
cannot happen when the sender is still busy
invLOs  
sSlist  empty

 sRlist  empty 
 lastsRlist   
 sRx  

 lastsRlist   
 sRx  
 serror 
The next invariant gives an obvious property of the speci	cation P
invpuStatesP	  
ulist  empty 

headulist   

oddlengthulist 
 lasttwoulist  	  	  
The two simple invariants below are not mentioned in 
BPV
invRXs  sRlist  empty  sRx  
invSXs  sStransmitting 
 sSlist  empty  sSx  
 Discussion 

Finally we de	ne a simulation relation SIM de	ned in LSL as follows

SIM  trait
includes S P
introduces SIM  StatesS	 StatesP	  Bool
asserts 
forall s  StatesS	 p  StatesP	
SIMsp 
if serror
then pchaos
else if sRlist  empty
then plist  sSlist 
 sSlist  empty 
 px  
else if sRx  sSx    tlastsRlist  
then plist  sRlist  sSlist

 Tpx

tlengthsRlist  tlastsRlist

minsRx sSx    tlastsRlist  
else plist  sRlist  	  sSlist

 Tpx

tlengthsRlist  tlastsRlist

minsRx sSx    tlastsRlist  
implies
ForwardSPSIM
Note that a lot of brackets are needed because in Larch it is impossible to de	ne a prece
dence for self de	ned operators
By the implies clause at the end of this trait it is claimed that SIM is a forward simulation
from S to P If that can be proved and we did then a meta result see for instance 
LV
tells us that S is indeed an implementation of P
How to read the simulation above The basic idea behind this simulation is that the
concatenation of the lists in the implementation sRlist and sSlist is about the same
as the message in transit plist Formally when the system is transmitting then the
following holds
plist  sRlist  sSlist 
	
plist  sRlist    sSlist
This is expressed in the third ifthenelse in the second ifthenelse it is tested if the system
is almost transmitting and in the 	rst it is tested if the system is in an error situation The
big inequations  Tpx   express that the system returns the messages in time
	 Discussion
In this section we will give some conclusions about this casestudy As said in the introduction
it is unlikely that a handwritten proof is awless In the 	rst subsection we will report on


the errors we encountered In the second subsection we will draw some conclusions about LP
and in the last subsection we will compare the approach of this paper with other approaches

 Errors in handwritten proof
As mentioned at the end of Section  we found a small error in the speci	cation of the
OUTaction of system P In some of the invariants a similar error existed namely that INV
was claimed while only error INV holds
The source of these mistakes was that the model in which the protocol was described
had been changed during the construction of the proof In the former model states where
error held were not accepted and traces that ended in a not accepted state were left out of
consideration Parts of the proof in the former model were still valid in the model presented
in 
BPV but unfortunately the subtlety with the error variable was overlooked
From a practical point of view these bugs were not so important because it was very easy
to 	x them It was far more time consuming to 	x an illegal proofstep in the TIME case
of the simulation There the following implication was assumed su  notX  Y 
su  notX  Y In general this does not hold For example when T equals  and
su  X   	
 Y   and st  X   	
 Y   then the implication does not
hold We had to make extra case distinctions and do some extra arithmetic
Because of the distance between the LPproof and the handwritten proof it is possible that
there are other illegal proof steps in the handwritten proof that were not noticed When
a conjecture is successfully proved by LP along similar lines we did not investigate the
handwritten proof
In the handwritten proof data identities like lastl   last twol
  


are used without a proof To our taste this is reasonable in a handwritten proof But when
a proof is mechanized in LP it is necessary to prove such data identities
For a lot of facts concerning the time domain the same can be said Facts like    and
x   x   are fairly obvious for humans In this paper we even proved these simple
ones Less obvious is for instance y    x 
 y  x  y    This is not proved in the
handwritten proof to our taste this is an omission It took some time to formulate them in
a proper way and prove them in LP

 About LP
In this section we will report on the use of LP
Installing and starting To start at the beginning it is easy to install LP Release a comes
with online documentation in HTML 	les that can be viewed using a WWW viewer For
release  a paper document 
GG is available to start with this is probably easier to
read In about ninety pages the ideas and commands of LP are explained and one can start
using LP The most important dierence between the two versions are Full 	rstorder logic
is supported not just the universalexistential subset supported by Release  Furthermore
a simple sort system for describing polymorphic abstractions is added
Statistics In Figure  the number of occurrences of LP commands is listed In the LP proofs
we also used a number of display commands but these are not included in the list because
 Discussion 
	
command ! meaning
prove  ask LP to prove a conjecture
res by   resume the prove by assuming the lhs
res by   resume by two cases  and 
res by case  resume by a case distinction
res by spec  resume by specialization
res by contra  resume by assuming the contradiction of the current goal
res by ind  resume by a proof by induction
rew  rewrite mostly in reversed direction
ins  instantiate variables in a fact
cripair  compute critical pairs
	x  	x a variable
reg  give part of ordering on function symbols
set  set system variables of LP
make  make facts immune passive etc
del  delete facts
dec  declare variables or functions
Figure  Number of uses of LP commands
class ! commands in 
bit  
naturals  
list  
time  
invariants  
main theorem   
TOTALS  
Figure  Number of LP commands used in the proof
these commands do not inuence the proof and could be deleted without harming the proof
Of course the commands often have arguments but mostly the complete command 	ts on
one line The total proof script consists of about  lines  Kb Beside the commands
it contains lines with annotations the boxes  and the diamonds 
The proofs can be divided in dierent classes the lemmas over the datatypes the invariants
and the simulation To gain some insight in the relative complexity of each class the number
of proof commands used to proof all lemmas in a class are depicted in Figure 
The proofs concerning time take up more than one third of the total proof This is caused
by the intrinsic complexity of the timing in the protocol and by the absence of arithmetic
procedures in LP Although the time lemmas are simple arithmetic our experience is that
it is equally hard to 	nd the right lemmas and in LP the time lemmas are even harder to
prove than the invariants
LP is fast enough to be used really interactive Running the complete proof script which
 
contains the proofs for the dataidentities the invariants and the simulation takes about 
hours on a Sun Sparc  The total number of proof commands is   So on the average
the execution of one command takes  seconds
Proving The LP proofs follow the lines of reasoning of the handwritten proofs that is the
induction schemes and case distinctions are the same When the handwritten proof refers to
an invariant in the LP proof it is mostly su"cient to instantiate the invariant with the current
state The normalization does the rest of the reasoning But especially when arithmetic is
involved the LP proof contains much more details than the handwritten proof
It is interesting to know how much eort it took to formalize the proof in LP But in this
case it is not possible to give an exact answer First of all this was our 	rst project with LP
so it took some time to get used to the system Furthermore the handwritten proof was not
error free so we also had to pay attention to the abstract content of the proof Also in the
formal proof we proved the dataidentities not present in the handwritten proof Finally we
had to cope with some problems in LP But we estimate that given a complete and correct
handwritten proof it still would take weeks to formalize it in LP
As said LP is really interactive almost too interactive Because no tactical language exists
for LP it is impossible to add your own decision procedures or proof heuristics A list of
commands can be saved in a script 	le and executed again but this is no substitute for a
tactical language In LP it is impossible to express things like Try dierent proofs till one
succeeds or to examine the structure of terms like If the current goal contains an ifthenelse
with a single variable as boolean then resume by a case distinction on that variable
Proof Management The Proof Management system of LP is very simple When LP generates
subgoals in response to a case distinction or induction proof the order in which these subgoals
must be proved is decided on by LP The only way to escape from this rigid system is by
adding a subgoal as an axiom to the system continue with the next subgoal and leave the
	rst one for another day Then rerun the generated script up to the point where the axiom
is added and then insert a prove for that subgoal There is some danger in this method
because LP lacks a special draftproof mode switch It is always allowed to add axioms so
it is up to the user to check that in the 	nal version no axioms remain that need a proof
It is also always allowed to cancel a proof Obvious this is the quickest way to get at the
qed which technically means in LP that there are no conjectures left to prove We claim that
our proof does not contain unintended added axioms or cancels We used grep

to search for
these commands in our proof script 	les Still we think that a special proof mode that one
can enter after loading the axioms would give some extra con	dence in LP proofs
As mentioned before the script 	le that contains our proof is about  Kb and takes 
hours to run Imagine that one makes a change at the end and wants to check if LP accepts
the new script This will take  hours for each revision So to keep the proof manageable
it is split in  lemmas and each lemma is proved in a separate 	le So if we change the proof
of one lemma we only have to check if LP accepts that one All lemmas are listed in one 	le
By assigning a level to each lemma and requiring that only lower level lemmas are used we

Unix command to search for a string in a set of les
 Discussion  

ensure that there is no cycle in the proof To make life a little easier a small nawk

program
is used to generate the standard begin of the LP scripts That is a command to load the
axioms some settings and adding the lower level lemmas as axioms
LSL comes with a library of traits Most of these traits contain an implies clause that
contains some important lemmas for that trait But it comes without a proof so the complete
sceptic is not satis	ed The script	les can be used to distribute proofs for these lemmas Some
care must be taken because LP proofs tend to be context dependent Operationally LP proofs
depend heavily on the normalization and so on the set of facts and the direction in which
the rules are oriented Logically one can extend the set of facts without harming the proof
operationally a new rule can disturb a proof This problem can be solved by making all
rules inactive except the rules that are used And then force the orientation for example by
giving a partial ordering on the function symbols The generation scheme of fresh constants
and variables is also a source of context dependency For instance in a proof by induction
or when assuming the left hand side of an implication fresh variables andor constants are
generated Variable names are b b b    for variables whose sort name begins with a B
and the 	rst free name is chosen For constants a c is added so the names are bc bc bc
    Because these names are generated in a proof context the next proof does not know
about these names But the constants and variables that we declare at top level are visible
everywhere and so they can inuence the generation of names To prevent problems with
unexpected names of fresh constants and variables it is advisable to use names that are not
in the generation scheme of LP
Software Management Besides that Larch is used to describe software LP itself is a software
product As to be expected with an experimental tool as LP we encountered some bugs A
critical bug was an alpha conversion problem When nm and k are of type Nat and this is
a rewrite rule n  m  
E k n  k  m The normalform of n  k was according to
LP   
E n n  n  k In the current version of LP a  this
bug is 	xed and the normalform is 
E n n  n  k
It was far more time consuming to cope with a memory problem Even when memory on
the machine and heap space in LP are ample available LP still runs out of memory During
our proof the system contains up to about four hundred rules and the proof is up to ten levels
deeply nested Steve Garland advised via mail to issue the command forget to delete a
data structure used for completion of rewrite systems This indeed frees memory but not
enough for our proof Our solution was to delete rules that are not needed any more in
the current proof context Finding the deletable rules is a time consuming trial and error
process One deletes a lot of rules to 	nd out later that a few of them are still needed and
then starts again this time without deleting those rules this time LP runs out of memory
etc
Just for the record we eventually checked the entire proof with LP Release a 
Next we will give our wish list for LP and LSL We think that the tactical language for
our purposes is by far the most important wish

A Clike pattern matching language
  
 Tactical language Without a good tactical language it is impossible to extend LP
with heuristics or decision procedures So proofchecking with LP remains at the level
of normalizing conjectures and proofs by induction etc While for really e"cient use of
proofcheckers it is necessary to have larger concepts For instance a tactic like try to
proof this invariant by case distinction on all booleans and apply a decision procedure
on the remaining expressions over the reals
 Arithmetic decision procedures With or without a tactical language arithmetic
decision procedures would be very useful In 
LSGL it is mentioned that a procedure
for linear inequalities is implemented Unfortunately most of the expressions in our
proof are not linear
 Larger proofs accepted without memory problems
 Better proof management It should be possible to use unproved lemmas and return
to them later or skip cases of an induction proof etc Furthermore it would be nice if
a proof can be saved in such way that the proved theorem can be loaded directly also
when the current set of facts is extended compared to the set from which the theorem
is proved
 Explicit names in LSL specications Standard facts in LP have the name of the
corresponding speci	cation followed by a number like in Nat One can work around
this because a conjecture can be named explicitly and a conjecture that is an axiom is
easy to prove
 More control over rewriting Sometimes a term has dierent redexes and it is
useful to be able to select one by hand For normalizing it would be nice if it is possible
to inuence the order in which the rewrite rules are applied

	 Related Work
The EEL protocol has received some attention from other sites In 
HWT Ho and Wong
Toi analysed the audio control protocol using the HyTech tool HyTech is a symbolic model
checker for linear hybrid systems Larsen Pettersson and Yi analysed the protocol with the
UPPAAL tool 
LPY They used a formalization of the protocol based on the one developed
by Ho and WongToi Daws and Yovine analysed the protocol using KRONOS in 
DY
The formalization used in this paper is dierent from the one used by the two others It is
not completely clear what the formal relation is between the 	nite state description used by
the model checkers and the version as presented in 
BPV It seems to be an interesting
research problem how to integrate modelchecking and proofchecking In 
MN M#uller and
Nipkow discuss this topic
In 
NS the IO automata model is formalized in IsabelleHOL In that paper a much
larger part of the IO automata model is formalized in contrast to the limited number of
notions that are formalized in this paper
Related to wish  is the work discussed in 
Voi In this paper a new proof environment
for LP is proposed which makes it possible to walk through the proof tree as suggested in
point 
A Example Proof  
A Example Proof
In this appendix a script	le of a LP proof is given It is hard to read the proof because
it depends on the set of facts which changes with every proof command So this proof is
presented here to give some idea of what a script	le looks like more than to show the actual
proof
set name p
prove timetwLT y   
 x  y  x  y  
res by 
  subgoal
prove step yc  
ins x by yc y by  z by  in timeF
	 conjecture
prove step   yc    
ins x by   yc y by  z by  in timeF
	 conjecture
prove step   yc    dT
prove hulpje   dT
ins x by T y by d z by dT in TimeLTF
ins x by T in time 
ins x by  y by d  dT z by  in timeLTF
	 conjecture
ins x by   yc   y by  z by dT in timeLTran
	 conjecture
prove step   yc  T  T  
ins x by   yc   y by dT z by T in timeLTF
make ina timeDis
rew timeLTF with rev timeDis
	 conjecture
prove step    yc  T    T
ins x by   T  yc  T y by  z by mT in timeLTF
	 conjecture
prove step yc  T    myc  T  mT
ins x by   T  yc y by   mT z by mT  yc in timeLTF
prove   T  yc  mT  yc  T  yc
set im on
prove hulpje     
	 conjecture
make ina hulpje
rew con with rev hulpje
make ina timeDis
rew con with rev timeDis
rew con with rev timeDis
	 conjecture
	 conjecture
prove step! yc  yc  T  yc    mT  yc  T
ins x by yc  T y by   mT  yc  T z by yc in timeLTF
	 conjecture
prove step Tyc  yc  T
make ina timeDis
rew con with rev timeDis
 
rew con with rev timeDis
rew con with rev timeDis
	 conjecture
prove step T  dT  yc  yc  
ins x by   T  yc y by yc      T z by dT in timeLTF
ins x by  T in time 
	 conjecture
prove step xc  yc  
set im anc
ins x by yc y by xc in TimeDefTwiddle
ins x by xc y by yc in timecom
ins x by xc y by   T  d  mT  yc z by yc   in timeLTran
	 conjecture
	  subgoal
	 conjecture
 quit
B The traits
B S
In this section we will present the trait that de	nes System S piece by piece

S  trait
includes SystemS List CommonActionsS
StatesS	 tuple of S Send R  Rec error  Bool
Send tuple of transmitting Bool
wirehigh  Bool
list  List
x  Time
Rec tuple of list  List
x  Time
Above the 	rst lines of the trait are given The name of the trait is S given on the 	rst
line of the trait Then the trait SystemS see Section  and the traits List and Time are
included see Section  Next the sort StatesS is de	ned its domain consists of triples of
 the state variables of the sender  the state variables of the receiver and  a history
variable error A history variable does not inuence the behaviour of the system The
extra information it provides is only used in the proof The sender has four state variables
transmitting is true when the system is transmitting that is from the 	rst UP action till
the last DOWN action The variable wire high denotes the level of the voltage on the bus
The variable list contains the bits of the message that still must be transmitted The clock
variable x is used to specify the distance between the UP and DOWN actions of the sender
The receiver has two state variables list denotes the bits of the current message that are
already received and the clock variable x denotes the time elapsed since the last UP action

introduces
UP   ActionsS	
DOWN   ActionsS	
aux  StatesS	 Time ActionsS	  Bool  auxiliaryfunction
B The traits  
The UP and DOWN actions are constants of type ActionsS the other actions IN OUT
and TIME are declared in CommonActions trait Furthermore the auxiliary function aux is
declared which is used in the actionpredicate of the TIME action

asserts
ActionsS	 generated by IN UP DOWN OUT TIME

forall ss StatesS	 m  List txyz Time
After the asserts keyword the properties of the functions the axioms are given The
generated by clause expresses that every action is an IN UP DOWN OUT or TIME
action

isVisibleUP
isVisibleDOWN
The actions UP and DOWN are declared invisible the actions IN OUT and TIME are
declared visible in the CommonActions trait

  START STATES 
starts   sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh

 sSlist  empty

 serror

 sRlist  empty
Initial the system is not transmitting the wire is low there is no message in transit the
lists are empty and no error has occurred yet Note that the values of the clocks Sx and
Rx are unde	ned and so we have an in	nite number of start states

  INm 
pres INm 
headm   
 oddlengthm 
 lasttwom  	  	
effs INm s  
if sStransmitting 
 sSwirehigh 
 sSlist  empty
then sSlist  m 
 sSx  
else sSlist  sSlist 
 sSx  sSx

 sStransmitting  sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh  sSwirehigh

 if sRlist  empty then serror else serror  serror

 sR  sR 
The IN action denotes the reception of a new message to be transmitted The precondition
expresses that each message must start with a bit  and that a message must be of odd length
or end in    see Section  The error variable becomes true when an IN action occurs
too early that is when the receiver is not yet ready to receive a new message

 
  UP 
presUP  auxssSxUP
auxsxUP  
sSwirehigh

 sSlist  empty

 if sStransmitting
then if headsSlist then x   else x  
else x  
effsUPs  
sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh

 if headsSlist  
then sSlist  tailsSlist 
 sSx  
else sSlist  sSlist 
 sSx  sSx

 serror  serror

 sRlist  empty  sRlist  	

 lastsRlist   
 sRlist  empty 
sRx  !  sRlist  empty

 !  sRx 
 sRx    sRlist  sRlist  	

   sRx  sRlist  sRlist  	  	

 lastsRlist   
sRx  !  sRlist  empty

 !  sRx 
 sRx    sRlist  sRlist  	

   sRx 
 sRx    sRlist  sRlist  	

   sRx  sRlist  sRlist  	  	

 sRx  
The UP action corresponds to an upgoing edge on the wire The sender generates the
UPs and DOWNs as required by the Manchester encoding The receivers algorithm to
decode the message via the UP actions is a direct formalization of the algorithm in Philips
documentation

  DOWN 
presDOWN  auxssSxDOWN
auxsxDOWN  
sSwirehigh

 if sSlist  empty 
 headsSlist   then x   else x  
effsDOWNs  
if sSlist  empty 
 sSlist  	
then sStransmitting
else sStransmitting  sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh

 if sSlist  empty 
 headsSlist  
then sSlist  tailsSlist 
 sSx  
else sSlist  sSlist 
 sSx  sSx

 serror  serror

 sR  sR
The DOWN action of course corresponds to a downgoing edge on the bus The receiver
does not observe this action and indeed the values of the state variables of the receiver do
B The traits  
not change sR  sR

  OUT 
presOUTm 
m  finalizesRlist 
 auxssRxOUTm
auxsxOUTm  
sRlist  empty

 if lastsRlist   then x   else x  
effsOUTms  
sRlist  empty

 sRx  sRx

 sS  sS

 serror  serror
When the receiver received the complete message the OUT action happens Hereafter the
receiver is ready to receive a new message


  TIME 
isStepsTIMEt s  
t  

 sStransmitting  sStransmitting

 sSwirehigh  sSwirehigh

 sSlist  sSlist

 serror  serror

 T  sSx  sSx  t 
 sSx  sSx  t  T

 
E y y  sSx 
 auxsyUP 

E z z  sSx 
 auxszUP

 
E y y  sSx 
 auxsyDOWN 

E z z  sSx 
 auxszDOWN

 sRlist  sRlist

 T  sRx  sRx  t 
 sRx  sRx  t  T

 
E y y  sRx 
 auxsyOUTm 

E z z  sRx 
 auxszOUTm
In the TIME action the discrete variables transmitting wire high list error are
not allowed to change Only the clocks are advanced by about t formally for both clocks
 T  
x
 
x
t
   T  must hold
B P
In this appendix the correctness criterion is given It is a LSLversion of system P of 
BPV
P  trait
includes SystemP Time List CommonActionsP
StatesP	 tuple of list  List
chaos  Bool
x  Time
introduces
aux  StatesP	 Time ActionsP	  Bool  auxiliaryfunction
asserts
 
ActionsP	 generated by IN OUT

forall ss  StatesP	 t  Time m  List xyz Time
starts  slist  empty 
 notschaos
presINm  
headm  

 oddlengthm 
 lasttwom  	  	
effsINms 
if slist  empty
then slist  m 
 sx   
 schaos  schaos
else schaos  true 
 slist  slist 
 sx  sx
presOUTm  auxssxOUTm
auxsxOUTm  
 slist  m

 slist  empty

 Tx    tlengthslist   

 schaos
effsOUTms 
slist  empty 
 schaos  schaos 
 sx  sx
isStepsTIMEts  
t  

 slist  slist

 schaos  schaos

 sx  sx  t

 
A m 
E y y  sx 
 auxsyOUTm 

E z z  sx 
 auxszOUTm
B	 CommonActions
The trait given in this appendix is needed for technical reasons In LSL sorts are disjunct and
here a CommonActions sort is introduced to make it possible to compare actions of dierent
systems
CommonActionsA  trait
assumes SystemA
introduces
IN  List  ActionsA	
OUT  List  ActionsA	
TIME  Time  ActionsA	
IN  List  CommonActions
OUT  List  CommonActions
TIME  Time  CommonActions
asserts 
forall m List t  Time
commonINm  INm
commonOUTm  OUTm
commonTIMEt  TIMEt
isVisibleINm
isVisibleOUTm
isVisibleTIMEt
B The traits  	
B Bit
In this appendix a little trait for the sort Bit is given Bits are the elements of the messages
transmitted by the protocol
Bit  trait
introduces
   Bit
asserts 
forall bit Bit
bit   
 bit  
  
B Nat
The sort Nat is introduced because it is the result sort of the length function on lists
Nat  trait
introduces
   Nat
s  Nat  Nat
    Nat Nat  Nat
odd Nat  Bool
asserts
Nat generated by s

forall nn Nat
  sn
sn  sn  n  n
n    n
n  sn  sn  n
odd
oddsn  oddn
B Time
Here the Time trait is given It is discussed in section 
Time  trait
includes Bit ACTime ACTime Nat
introduces
       Time Time  Bool
        Time Time  Bool
       Time Time  Time
       Time Time  Time
m  Time  Time
d  Time  Time
min  Time  Time  Time
t  Bit  Time
t  Nat  Time
!    Time
!    Time
    TimeTime  Bool
TpTmTmTpT   Time

asserts 
forall xyzt Time n  Nat
 Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics Chang C C and Keisler H J
 Volume ! Model Theory Page !
 LINEAR ORDER Axioms
x  y 
 y  z  x  z  TimeL
x  y 
 y  x  x  y  TimeL
x  x  TimeL!
x  y 
 y  x  TimeL
 ABELIAN GROUPS
 x  y  z  x  y  z  associativity of 
x    x  TimeId identity
 
E y x  y   
 y  x  
x  mx    TimeMx existence of inverse
 x  y  y  x  commutativity of 
 FIELDS  These  axiomas  Abelian groups
  x  x  TimeUn  is unit
 x  y  z  x  y  z  associativity of 
 x  y  y  x  commutativity of 
x  y  x  z  x  y  z TimeDis distributivity of  over 
  Time  Time
 x    
E y y  x    existence of multiplicative inverse
x    x  dx    TimeDx
 ORDERD FIELDS  These   Field  Linear Order
x  y  x  z  y  z  TimeF
x  y 
   z  x  z  y  z  TimeF
tBit  
tBit  
tNat  
tsn  tn  
 Notational convenience
x  y  y  x 
x  y 
 x  y  x  y  TimeLT
x  y  y  x 
xy  x  dy
x  y  x  my
minxy  if x  y then x else y TimeMin
         ! !               
                        
         ! !               
                   
 Specific for this proof
  T 
 T   
pTmT  TT mTpT  TT
T  T  x  y 
 y  T  T  x  x  y
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